

## **Seminar IRH-ICUB**

### **Consciousness and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Approach**

<https://irhunibuc.wordpress.com/2016/04/05/new-seminar-consciousness-in-philosophy-and-neuroscience/>

**convenor Dr. Diana Stanciu**

<https://irhunibuc.wordpress.com/associated-members/>

**Date: Thursday, 26 April 2018, 17h**

**Place: IRH-ICUB (1 D. Brandza Str.), conference room**

## **Dr. Diana Stanciu**

**Institute for Research in the Humanities**

**University of Bucharest (IRH-ICUB)**

**Diana Stanciu** has been the convenor of the research seminar and series of lectures *Consciousness and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Approach* at the University of Bucharest) (<https://irhunibuc.wordpress.com/2016/04/05/new-seminar-consciousness-in-philosophy-and-neuroscience>) since April 2016. She is an experienced researcher with extensive international activity who specialised in the history of philosophy, culture and religion until 2014-2015 and afterwards started working on embodied/extended cognition and consciousness and also on conscious agency and free will in moral decision-making at the interface of philosophy and neuroscience. Her research has resulted in several publications, conferences and outreach (details in the CV, on the research seminar webpage).

### ***Conscious Agency and Free Will***

Newly acquired knowledge in cognitive science and neuroscience on brain systems and their dynamics during decision-making generated major changes in the philosophical methodology for the study of decision-making in the last two decades (Greene et al. 2001, 2004, Levy 2011, Kahane et al. 2012, 2015, Shenhav, Greene 2014, Knobe 2015). Special attention is granted to the difference between conscious agency and agency without conscious intention, which is often triggered by extended cognition rather than by computationalism – that is, by automatism and habits established during social practice rather than by rationally construed mental representations. I am rather interested in mixed sense of agency: an ‘online’, basic one that does not require conscious intention and an ‘offline’ post-act judgment that can be sometimes distorted or illusory (Gallagher 2007, Synofzik 2008). The question is, in fact, to what extent we are reason-responsive (at least in the first instance) when a moral decision is required/ advisable. To that I would add a few necessary explanations on the distinction in philosophy between freedom and free will, which will suggest that body processes generating agency (Aristotle’s vegetative soul) are not necessarily undermining the idea of free will.